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Fetal Personhood Laws as Limits to Maternal
Personhood at Any Stage of Pregnancy: Balancing
Fetal and Maternal Interests at Post-Viability
Among Fetal Pain and Fetal Homicide Laws
Bernice Bird*
INTRODUCTION
State fetal personhood laws1 continuously diminish women’s privacy
rights to terminate or continue pregnancies. Currently, state governments
pass both fetal pain and fetal homicide laws that legislate over any stage of
pregnancy.2 Each type of personhood law, however, unlawfully impacts
pregnant women’s privacy rights differently. Most fetal pain laws prohibit
*Florida Bar, 2013; American University Washington College of Law, 2013, LL.M.,
summa cum laude (Law & Government); Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of
Law, 2012, J.D., cum laude; Florida International University, 2007, M.S., summa cum laude
(Counseling Psychology); Rollins College, 2003, B.S., cum laude (Psychology). Thank you:
to my family, for their unending, unconditional, and loving support, and to the editorial
board of the Hastings Women’s Law Journal for their assistance in improving this article.
1. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATION, Fetal Homicide Laws, http://www.
ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013)
(hereinafter Fetal Homicide Laws). This paper is limited to the examination of recent
prosecutions of pregnant women for feticide under state fetal personhood laws enacted as
fetal homicide and fetal pain laws. For more analysis on federal fetal personhood laws and
proposed bills, see Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2004);
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2011, S.314, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s314/text (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (failed the
House vote as H.R. 6099 in the 109th Congress; introduced in the Senate in the 110th
Congress as S. 356); Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr23/text (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). For more
on the prosecution of pregnant women for injury to fetuses under chemical endangerment
statutes see James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal
Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (1991). Moreover, this
paper does not analyze the impact of state partial birth abortion legislation in relation to the
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act and whether the federal law serves as an additional
undue burden in the post-viable stage of pregnancy. For more on this analysis see Anne
MacLean Massie, So-Called “Partial Birth Abortion Bans:” Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad
Law? Definitely!, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 301 (1998); Alissa Schecter, Note, Choosing Balance:
Congressional Powers and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1987 (2005).
2. See Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1; GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, An Overview of
Abortion Laws, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (hereinafter
GUTTMACHER).
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abortions that purportedly cause fetal pain at twenty weeks.3 As pre-viable
pregnancy regulations, fetal pain laws unconstitutionally infringe on
women’s right to reproduce without state interference, as reaffirmed in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.4
As post-viable pregnancy regulations, fetal homicide laws are undue
burdens5 to women’s right to reproduce because the laws lack maternal life
and health exceptions precluding maternal prosecution. Fetal homicide
laws, though initially created to protect both mothers and fetuses,6 serve to
wholly protect fetal life and prosecute any perpetrator responsible for fetal
death, including the mother. 7 Maternal prosecutions associate pregnant
behaviors with criminal sanctions and, therefore, “hinder”8 the “free
choice”9 to reproduce. Accordingly, pregnant women suffer encroachment
of their liberty interest to continue or terminate pregnancy at all stages of
pregnancy.
This paper proposes that state fetal pain and homicide laws should only
apply to regulating the post-viable stages of pregnancy, while affording
policy considerations for maternal life, physical and mental health. Part I
examines the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift in defining fetal personhood.
Section A argues that Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey
limited the expansion of fetal personhood rights in protecting women’s
rights to terminate and continue pregnancies. Section B asserts that
Gonzalez v. Carhart expanded the definition of fetal personhood in the
context of partial birth abortions and thereafter influenced state policy.
Part II analyzes state fetal personhood laws as overriding maternal
personhood in the interest of protecting fetal life. Section A provides an
overview of fetal pain laws at the state level. Moreover, Section A argues
that fetal pain laws are unconstitutional restrictions on the pre-viable stages
of pregnancy because pregnant women retain their privacy interests prior to
viability. Section B discusses fetal homicide laws as undue burdens in the
post-viable stages of pregnancy because they lack maternal life and health
exceptions to maternal prosecution. Part III examines policy change in
both fetal pain and fetal homicide laws in proposing that fetal personhood
laws limit their regulations to post-viable stages of pregnancy while
retaining maternal life and health interests. Suggestions for policy changes
include state funding and improvement of mental health facilities, drug

3. GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.
4. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
5. Id. at 877.
6. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
7. See Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Jack Elliott,
Jr., Analysis: Mississippi’s Fetal Homicide Law Gets Court Scrutiny, COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Apr. 1, 2013, 7:07 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/apr/14/analysismississippis-fetal-homicide-law-gets/.
8. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
9. Id.

BIRD FINAL TO PRINT 10.29 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2014]

10/31/2013 1:19 PM

FETAL PERSONHOOD LAWS

41

rehabilitation centers, and policies that restrict imprisonment of pregnant
women for chemical endangerment of fetuses.

I. U.S. SUPREME COURT ON ABORTION: CHANGING
DEFINITIONS OF FETAL PERSONHOOD
The U.S. Supreme Court’s line of abortion cases10 granting women a
limited privacy right to abortion11 has conceptualized reproductive freedom
from a pro-choice12 to a pro-life13 context. In doing so, the Court’s
doctrinal shift has restructured the definition of fetal personhood.
A. ROE V. WADE & PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY: LIMITING FETAL
PERSONHOOD
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade14 that a Texas
statute criminalizing abortions was unconstitutional and overbroad, except
when medically necessary to save the life of the mother.15 The Roe Court
declared that a woman’s right to terminate or continue a pregnancy was a

10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). This paper limits its
discussion of Supreme Court rulings on abortion jurisprudence to the aforementioned cases,
as they pertain to key discussions on fetal personhood set forth in Roe v. Wade. For more
Supreme Court rulings on the right to terminate pregnancies, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 326–27 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment as a federal restriction for those states
participating in Medicaid to validly refuse women medically unnecessary abortions);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (invalidating Minnesota law requiring notification of both parents and
waiting period for minor to obtain abortion).
11. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
12. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
13. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124. The pro-choice and pro-life rhetoric of the Roe and Casey
Courts is reflected in both the verbiage used to describe abortion procedures and the
doctrine. The pro-life dialogue of the Gonzalez Court is reflected in its choice of words in
describing partial birth abortions as a way of “killing” fetuses. See Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at
139. In a word search excluding headnotes, the Gonzalez Court referred to abortions as a
method of “killing,” approximately twenty-eight times, while using the term “terminate” six
times. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124. In contrast, the Court’s majority opinions in both Roe and
Casey each used the word “kill” to refer to abortions only one time. Roe, 410 U.S. at 137;
Casey, 505 U.S. at 980. Instead, the Roe and Casey Courts utilized the term “terminate” to
refer to a woman’s choice to end her pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (using the term
“terminate” approximately twelve times, excluding headnotes); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (using
the term “terminate” approximately thirty-six times, excluding headnotes).
14. 410 U.S. 113. On the same day as Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a Georgia
statute criminalizing abortions in the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 179
(1973). The Doe Court clarified the health exception to a woman’s right to procure
abortions. The Court held that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional in requiring women
to seek abortions in hospitals, with confirmation of two independent doctors, after approval
from hospital abortion committees. Doe, 410 U.S. at 194–201. In defining the health
exception to abortions, the Doe Court reasoned “that [] medical judgment may be exercised
in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s
age—relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.” Id. at
192.
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
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unique privacy right that existed within the Fourteenth Amendment;
however, the right was not “absolute.”16 Unlike other judicially declared
privacy rights,17 the state may curtail the privacy right in order to safeguard
the important interests of promoting the potential life of the unborn child
and safeguarding the mother’s health.18 That is, a woman maintains the
privacy right to her bodily integrity and, therefore, a choice to terminate or
continue a pregnancy, until the point of fetal viability.19
The Roe Court developed a trimester framework to balance the
mother’s privacy rights with the state’s interests to protect the health of the
mother and life of the fetus.20 According to Roe, the mother’s privacy right
to terminate a pregnancy is narrowly construed to exist between only the
mother and her consulting physician during the first trimester.21 Therefore,
the state may not legislate on matters of the womb during the first
trimester. During the second trimester, the state may legislate over
abortion in a manner that is reasonably related to promoting the interest of
maternal health.22 Finally, the state may prohibit or regulate abortion
“subsequent to viability,”23 unless abortion is medically necessary to save
the life and health of the mother.24
As a result, fetal viability became the definitive line demarcating the
division between proper state interference and individual privacy
interests.25 A fetus is viable when it may “potentially live outside the
mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid,”26 which occurs between twentyfour and twenty-eight weeks into the pregnancy.27 Therefore, fetal
personhood is not legally possible under Roe, as the Court interpreted the
Constitution to grant legal rights to persons already born.28 Fetal

16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
17. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925) (extending the privacy right to
education); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (reasoning the fundamental right to
marry is within the personal right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (reasoning the personal right to privacy affords a right to contraception within
married couples). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (extending the
privacy right to unmarried people).
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
19. Id. See also Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[After viability] the
State’s interest in unborn human life is stealthily downgraded to a merely ‘substantial’ or
‘profound’ interest . . . . (That had to be done, of course, since designating the interest as
‘compelling’ throughout pregnancy would have been, shall we say, a ‘substantial obstacle’
. . . to reaffirm . . . the ‘central holding’ of Roe.”).
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 164–65.
25. Id. at 164.
26. Id. at 160 (citing LOUIS M. HELLMAN & JACK A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS
493 (14th ed. 1971); DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965)).
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
28. Id. at 157.
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personhood could not logically and legally coexist with the right to
terminate pregnancies.29 “If this suggestion of personhood is established,
the . . . case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”30 In recognizing
fetal personhood, the state could prosecute women who procure abortions
on the grounds of feticide.
In 1992, the Court reaffirmed the “essential holding”31 of Roe in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, while
abolishing the trimester framework.32 The Casey Court held that the
following provisions of a Pennsylvania statute were not an undue burden to
the right to terminate a pregnancy: (1) the medical emergency definition;33
(2) the requirement of informed consent within a twenty-four hour waiting
period;34 (3) the parental consent provision for unemancipated minors,35
and (4) the medical recordkeeping provision.36 However, the Court
reasoned that the spousal notification provision was an undue burden to
women seeking abortions because domestic violence influenced women’s
reproductive choices.37
According to Casey, women have the right to “choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the State.”38 An “undue burden” was defined as any “regulation . . . [that]
plac[ed] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus.”39 Moreover, the Court reasoned that “the means
chosen by the state to further the interest in potential life must be calculated
to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”40 Therefore, an undue
burden serves to hinder a woman’s free choice to terminate or, as its legal
opposite, continue her pregnancy.

29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157–58.
30. Id. at 156–57.
31. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 880 (reasoning that the definition of medical emergency as posing a “serious
risk” to the mother’s health was sufficiently broad enough and did not act as an undue
burden).
34. Id. at 881 (reasoning that requiring informed consent within twenty four hours for
physician to inform women of the nature of the procedure and gestational age of the unborn
child is not a substantial undue burden of delay, cost or risk).
35. Id. at 899 (reasoning that, except in a medical emergency, the judicial bypass
provision allowing minors to seek abortions without parental consent upon a finding of
capacity and maturity, if the abortion is in the minor’s best interests, was not an undue
burden).
36. Id. at 900–01 (reasoning that maintaining medical records on demographic data of
abortion procedures was necessary for health interests and medical research).
37. Id. at 894.
38. Id. at 846.
39. Id. at 877.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Court enumerated that the holding contained three parts:
First[, there] is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests
are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right
to elect the procedure. Second[, there] is a confirmation of the
State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies[,] which endanger the
woman’s life or health. And third[, there] is the principle that the
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that
may become a child.41
In upholding the key premises of Roe, the Casey Court incorporated the
Roe Court’s rejection of fetal personhood, as it would abridge a woman’s
right to terminate and, likewise, continue her pregnancy. The right to
terminate pregnancy is based on the fundamental liberty to use
contraception,42 which includes the choice to terminate pregnancy, use
contraception, or forego either and, instead, continue the pregnancy and
raise the “human life that results.”43 The Casey Court, in its dicta, sought
to protect these privacy rights as part of a woman’s liberty interest to
“control . . . her [own] destiny.”44 Moreover, the Court emphasized that
fetuses cannot “override the rights of the woman”45 until the point of
viability thereby further addressing the need of privacy protection, at least
during the pre-viable stages of pregnancy.
Therefore, the Casey Court restricted state regulation on all pregnant
women in the pre-viable stages, rather than limiting its opinion to pregnant
women choosing to terminate their pregnancies.
Without directly
addressing fetal personhood, Casey established that prior to viability,
pregnant women are entitled to continue or terminate their pregnancy
without state restriction.
B. GONZALEZ V. CARHART: EXPANDING FETAL PERSONHOOD
In 2007, however, the Court confused legal scholars46 by “blur[ring]
the lines, firmly drawn in Casey,”47 on the application of the health

41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
42. Id. at 852–53 (relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 538 (1972)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 869.
45. Id. at 870.
46. See Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment after Gonzalez v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 147–53
(2010); Michael C. Dorf, Abortion Rights, 23 TOURO. L. REV. 815, 822–24 (2008).
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exception to “partial birth abortions.”48 The Court upheld the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“PBABA”) in Gonzalez v. Carhart,49 reasoning
that its absence of a health exception did not pose an undue burden as a
federal restriction of “partial birth abortions”50 upon fetal viability.51 The
PBABA prohibited practitioners from “knowingly perform[ing] a partialbirth abortion . . . that is [not] necessary to save the life of a mother.”52
The Court declared that federal restrictions to partial birth abortions
could exist without a health exception for women, contrary to Casey,
because there remained a significant medical uncertainty as to the health
benefits of dilation and evacuation procedures in later term pregnancies.53
Primarily, the medical uncertainty surrounding the benefits54 of these
abortion procedures served to justify the federal restriction as reasonable,
rather than undue.55 Moreover, the Court reasoned that it could not
interpret Casey’s health exception as to allow medical professionals to
perform any abortion procedures at their discretion.56 Rather, the state had
an interest to regulate the medical profession insofar as to protect the
profession from suffering a negative public perception on the “appropriate
role of a physician during the delivery process, [because partial birth

47. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147. “Partial birth” abortions are commonly referred in the
medical community as “intact dilation and evacuation” or “dilation and extraction”
procedures. Id. at 170 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For an explanation on the “dilation
and extraction” and “intact dilation and evacuation procedures,” see Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 915 (2000).
49. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147. Seven years earlier in 2000, the Court heard Stenberg v.
Carhart, in which the Court reviewed a Nebraska statute criminalizing “partial birth
abortions” without an exception to safeguard the health of women. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at
921. The Court invalidated the statute because of the absence of the health exception, as the
statute posed an undue burden to reproductive freedom. Id. As a result of the Stenberg
decision, approximately thirty states declared their partial birth abortion bans unenforceable.
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-keyabortion-rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/ (hereinafter “PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC
LIFE”).
50. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147. Approximately nineteen states prohibit partial birth
abortions in the pre-viable and post-viable stages of pregnancy. See GUTTMACHER, supra
note 2. Three of these states only implement post-viable restrictions to partial birth
abortions. Id. Incidentally, the government of El Salvador prohibits abortions, even at the
cost of saving the life of the mother. Jodi Jacobson, Women’s Rights Groups Demand
Immediate Action for El Salvadoran Woman in Need of Life-Saving Abortion (Apr. 25,
2013, 4:05 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/04/25/womens-rights-groups-demand
-immediate-action-for-el-salvadoran-woman-in-need-of-life-saving-abortion/.
51. See Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147.
52. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 124. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2006)).
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 166–67 (stating that the statute was not invalid particularly when there were
other methods of abortion available for women in the second trimester).
55. Id. at 158.
56. Id.
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abortion procedures] pervert[] a process during which life is brought into
the world.”57
Unlike the past key decisions on abortion, the Gonzalez Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Kennedy, emphasized the states’ interest to
safeguard and promote the “respect of human life.”58 The Court reasoned
that the PBABA was constitutional because it prohibited “a method of
abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the birth
process.”59 Furthermore, the Court deferred to legislative history that
“implicitly approving such a[n] . . . inhumane procedure . . . will further
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable
and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such
life.”60 The Court expressed that “[dilation and evacuation] is a procedure
itself laden with the power to devalue human life.”61
Moreover, the Gonzalez Court strengthened the argument for fetal
personhood laws in writing that the PBABA “appl[ied] [to] both previability and post-viability because, by common understanding and
scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb,
whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”62 In the reasoning, the Court
constructively reversed the mandates of Casey in announcing personhood
rights to pre-viable fetuses. Furthermore, Gonzalez interpreted the state’s
power to regulate reproductive freedom for the interest of “promot[ing]
respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy,”63 contrary to Roe and
Casey. Specifically, “the government has a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.”64 Finally, the Gonzalez
holding resulted in the judicial approval of state legislatures to create
abortion policy, without regard to medical findings.65

II. FETAL PERSONHOOD ENCROACHING ON ALL STAGES
OF PREGNANCY
After Roe v. Wade, many state legislatures enacted fetal personhood
laws as a challenge to the reproductive right to terminate a pregnancy.66 In

57. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 160.
58. Id. at 159.
59. Id. at 157.
60. Id. at 157 (citing to Congressional Findings ¶ (14)(N)).
61. Id. at 158. The Court cites at length the Congressional record in stating that the
prohibited abortion methods under the Act had a “disturbing similarity to the killing of a
newborn infant.” Id. (citing Congressional Findings ¶ (14)(L)).
62. Id. at 147. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 163. (emphasis added).
64. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 145.
65. Id. at 129. (“Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power
in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.”)
66. James MacPherson, North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill Passes House, Sent to Governor
Jack Dalrymple, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.huffington
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particular, fetal pain laws became ubiquitous among the states after
Gonzalez v. Carhart.67 Most fetal pain laws prohibit abortions as early as
twenty weeks.68 These laws unconstitutionally regulate the pre-viable
stages of pregnancy and infringe on women’s privacy.
Various fetal homicide laws were also the states’ response to Roe v.
Wade.69 State legislatures enacted fetal homicide laws, also known as
“unborn victims of violence”70 laws, with the legislative intent of
protecting both the mother and unborn child.71 Most commonly, states
prosecuted third party assailants for injury or death to the unborn child.72
However, chemical endangerment laws also served as means to prosecute
mothers73 for feticide. At post-viability, fetal homicide laws act as undue
burdens on reproductive freedom because the laws prosecute pregnant
women without affording maternal life or health exceptions for policy
considerations.
Ultimately, state governments overreach their powers and restrict both
a woman’s right to terminate and continue her pregnancy at all stages of
pregnancy. This section examines (1) fetal pain laws; and, (2) fetal
homicide laws at the state level.
A. STATE FETAL PAIN LAWS
The fetal pain laws are unconstitutional pre-viable restrictions on
women’s rights to terminate and continue pregnancies. Moreover, the laws
constructively serve as the states’ effort to coerce female citizens to
continue pregnancies.
1. Overview
Although the medical and legislative research is still in substantial
disagreement on whether fetuses feel pain upon administration of stimuli at
twenty weeks,74 Gonzalez v. Carhart has “emboldened”75 state legislatures
post.com/2013/04/12/north-dakota-fetal-pain_n_3071760.html (hereinafter North Dakota
Fetal Pain Bill).
67. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 49.
68. GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.
69. North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill, supra note 66.
70. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
71. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
72. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
73. Marie Diamond, Pregnant Women Who Lose Babies Face Criminal Charges in
Mississippi, Alabama, (July 1, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/07/01/
256823/pregnant-women-criminal-charges/. See also NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN, Truthout Covers NAPW and Our Cases, June 2012 Archives, (June 15, 2012),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2012/06/ (hereinafter NAPW).
74. Denise Grady, Study Finds 29-Week Fetuses Probably Feel No Pain and Need No
Anesthesia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/health/
24fetus.html?_r=0; Texas: Pro-Life Side Wins Debate Over Fetal-Pain Abortion Ban, Mar.
18, 2013, http://www.lifenews.com/2013/04/18/texas-pro-life-side-wins-debate-over-fetalpain-abortion-ban/.
75. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 49.
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to pass restrictive reproductive laws. As of 2013, forty-one states prohibit
abortion upon fetal viability, unless to save the life or health of the
mother.76 However, several states prohibit abortions during the previability stage of pregnancy in contradiction to Casey and Roe. For
instance, Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Louisiana,
and North Carolina prohibit abortions at twenty weeks into the pregnancy,
except for the life or health of the mother.77 These states prohibit abortions
at twenty weeks on the theory that fetuses experience pain from abortions.78
In March of 2013, North Dakota, the state with the “toughest
restrictions on abortion in the country,”79 signed into law a “fetal heartbeat
bill” banning abortions six weeks into pregnancy upon detection of a fetal
heartbeat.80 Notably, North Dakota has also passed a “fetal pain” bill on all
abortions twenty weeks into pregnancy on the premise that fetuses feel pain
at twenty weeks.81 Additionally, if ratified by the voters in the November
2014 election, North Dakota could become the first state to pass a “fetal
personhood amendment” to its State Constitution so that a fertilized egg
has the same right to life as any living person.82
2. Pre-Viable Fetal Pain Laws: Unconstitutional State Interference in
Women’s Privacy
The fetal pain bans on pre-viable abortions unlawfully infringe on the
privacy interests of pregnant mothers. The state’s interest to protect fetal
pain has expanded the state’s reach into the pre-viable stages of pregnancy
against women’s right to privacy set forth in both Casey and Roe. A
careful reading of Gonzalez, and the states’ reproductive policies that
followed, would lead to the conclusion that states have the authority to
legislate on reproductive rights in the absence of medical certainty.83
Moreover, unlike Casey and Roe, the Court in Gonzalez explicitly stated
that state governments have an interest to “promote respect for human life
at all stages in the pregnancy[.]”84 Thus, states have the legal basis to
legislate during pre-viability in the absence of medical certainty in the
interest of fetal life, despite its detrimental consequences to women’s
privacy rights.

76.
77.
78.
79.

GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.
GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 49.
Mira Oberman, North Dakota Now Has the Toughest Restrictions in the Country,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/northdakota-introduces-toughest-abortion-laws-in-the-country-2013-3.
80. North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill, supra note 66.
81. North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill, supra note 66.
82. Oberman, supra note 79.
83. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 129 (2007). (“Medical uncertainty does not
foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in
other contexts.”)
84. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
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The fetal pain laws dilute both the choices to terminate pregnancy and
continue a pregnancy. Particularly, the pre-viable fetal pain laws serve as
pieces of moral legislation for the state to deter abortions. If a pregnant
woman cannot seek an abortion prior to twenty weeks, contrary to Casey,
then the state has effectively removed her choice to continue her
pregnancy. Rather, she must either carry to term or travel to a favorable
jurisdiction. Travel, however, is expensive for many women and may
prove burdensome, especially if in a state with only one abortion clinic.85
Moreover, the fetal pain laws may have a discriminatory impact on women
of lower socioeconomic status. Women of lower socioeconomic means
may lack the education to understand that fetal pain is not empirically
validated. As a result of constructive state coercion, many women will
refuse an abortion and continue their pregnancies, even if their social
circumstances are undesirable, because they empathize with their fetuses.
Furthermore, the states’ estimated assumptions that a fetus can
experience pain prior to viability is irrelevant, given that Roe clearly sets
forth that unborn children have no legal rights under the Constitution.86 As
Roe reasoned, if fetuses had a legal right to life and personhood, then states
and courts could proscribe their mothers’ rights to abortions altogether.87
Although Casey’s dicta states that, subsequent to viability, an unborn
child’s interest could “override the rights of the woman,”88 this does not
further the state’s interest to regulate pre-viable pregnancies. If anything,
Casey’s dicta may provide states a legal basis to create fetal protection laws
in the post-viable stages of pregnancy, while remaining limited to the
health and life needs of the mother. Thus, if broadly construed, a fetus’s
“personhood” is as limited as its mother’s, while in the womb. However,
current fetal personhood laws are so burdensome as to deter women’s “free
choice”89 to reproduce in regulating both the pre-viable stages and postviable stages of pregnancy without maternal life or health exceptions.
B. STATE FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS
Under fetal homicide laws, various states have prosecuted pregnant
women for behavior resulting in the deaths of their unborn children.90
Although fetal homicide laws enable states to regulate “any stage of

85. See Sarah Kliff, North Dakota’s Only Abortion Clinic Isn’t Going Anywhere,
WASHINGTON POST, (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp
/2013/04/02/north-dakotas-only-abortion-clinic-isnt-going-anywhere/; Campbell Robertson,
Judge Prevents Closing of Mississippi’s Sole Abortion Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/ruling-prevents-closing-of-mississippis-only-aborti
on-clinic.html?_r=1&.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58 (1973).
87. Id.
88. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
89. Id. at 877.
90. See Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. App. 2012); Elliott, supra note 7.
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pregnancy,”91 most legal challenges involve women who have lost
pregnancies in the post-viable stages of pregnancy. At post-viability, fetal
homicide laws pose as invalid, undue burdens on women’s choices to
continue pregnancies because the laws lack maternal life or health
exceptions for state policy considerations precluding maternal prosecution.
Rather, the fear of criminal sanctions related to pregnancy-based behaviors
causing feticide influences women’s reproductive freedom.
1. Overview
States have enacted fetal homicide laws for the legislative purpose of
protecting both mothers and their unborn children from the acts of third
parties.92 Since the 1970s, various courts have determined that viable
fetuses were human beings and were entitled to legal protection. 93 In total,
38 states have enacted fetal homicide laws, while twenty-three of them
regulate “any stage of gestation”94 from “conception to live birth.”95
Eleven states explicitly preclude prosecution of legal abortion under the
fetal homicide laws.96
Pro-choice advocates argue that fetal personhood laws grant unborn
children fetal personhood rights that may criminalize pregnant mothers’
behavior that results in miscarriages or stillbirths, such as substance
abuse.97 Rather, state legislatures should only protect pregnant mothers and
punish their assailants.98 Moreover, the fetal homicide laws serve to create

91. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
92. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
93. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 628 (1970) (rejecting the “born alive”
rule in order to accommodate fetuses as protected class under California’s murder statute);
contra Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219 (1977) (rejecting application of
child endangerment statute to unborn fetus in prosecution of mother ingesting heroin while
pregnant causing twins’ heroin addiction); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326
(Mass. 1984) (applying viable fetuses to vehicular homicide statute); State v. Horne, 319
S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);
State ex rel. Angela M. W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). As
early as the 1300s, the common law enabled prosecution for infanticide; however, the
common law did not recognize fetal homicide per se. Joanne Pedone, Filling the Void:
Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 80.
(2009). Rather, a plaintiff had to establish that the infant was “born alive” and subsequently
died as a result of third-party injuries while in utero. Id. at 81.
94. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1 (listing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419).
95. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1 (listing MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37). The list of
states that regulate pregnancy in the pre-viable and post-viable stages are Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See supra.
96. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. The following states explicitly preclude
punishment of abortion under their fetal homicide laws: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. See supra.
97. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
98. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
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an adversarial relationship between the fetus and mother.99 Pro-life
advocates assert, however, that the state has an interest to safeguard both
the fetus and mother from violent acts.100
In general, states have used fetal homicide laws against women in the
interest of promoting, and seeking retribution for, fetal life. States with
chemical endangerment laws have recently prosecuted women under these
laws as vehicles to prosecute for fetal homicide.101 The defendant-mothers’
profiles paint a picture of mentally infirm or drug dependent women who
are victims of the states’ political agendas to eradicate drugs and abortion.
In 2006, the State of Mississippi charged its first defendant, fifteenyear-old Rennie Gibbs with depraved heart murder for the stillbirth of her
thirty-six week-old fetus on the theory that her cocaine habit caused its
death.102 As an adolescent, Gibbs faces a life sentence for the stillbirth.103
In an amicus brief in support of Gibbs to the Mississippi Supreme Court in
2012, a myriad of public health professionals and the American Civil
Liberties Union of Mississippi argued that “[s]uch prosecutions deter
pregnant women from seeking prenatal care and drug and alcohol
treatment.”104 Moreover, amici argued that maternal prosecutions could
potentially encourage termination of pregnancies among women struggling
with drug dependency as an avenue to avoid criminal penalties.105
Additionally, in 2010, the State of Mississippi prosecuted Nina
Buckwalter for manslaughter when she delivered a stillborn.106 The State
alleged that her illicit drug use demonstrated “callous disregard for life”107
thereby causing the stillbirth. The circuit judge dismissed the case
reasoning that the state legislature did not intend to criminalize pregnant
women’s actions.108 However, the case was appealed to the Mississippi
Supreme Court.109 Four similar cases are pending in the court system on
whether women are criminally culpable for the deaths of their fetuses.110

99. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
100. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
101. Elliott, supra note 7.
102. Ed Pilkington, Outcry in America as Pregnant Women Who Lose Babies Face
Murder Charges, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 24, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://m.guardiannews.com/
world/2011/jun/24/america-pregnant-women-murder-charges. For a list of Mississippi’s
fetal homicide laws, see Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.
103. Pilkington, supra note 102.
104. Brief for Nat’l Ass’n Soc. Workers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-M-819, available at http://www.socialworkers.org/assets/secured/
documents/ldf/briefDocuments/Gibbs%20v%20State%20MS%20Sup.Ct.Amicus%20Brief.
pdf.
105. Id.
106. Elliott, supra note 7.
107. Elliott, supra note 7.
108. Elliott, supra note 7.
109. Elliott, supra note 7.
110. Elliott, supra note 7.
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Alabama also introduced the Chemical Endangerment Act of 2006 to
protect children from exposure to their parents’ use and manufacture of
methamphetamines.111 The State prosecuted Amanda Kimbrough for the
stillbirth of her premature child, alleging that the baby’s death was the
result of her drug use during pregnancy.112 Kimbrough struggled with drug
dependency113 and chose to continue her pregnancy, nonetheless.114
Kimbrough reported that she was dependent on methamphetamine after her
first marriage.115
During her pregnancy, Kimbrough had refused
prescription medication for the health of the unborn child, primarily
because the fetus had already developed various medical complications,
such as a prolapsed cord.116 Kimbrough’s physician had diagnosed her
unborn child with Down Syndrome and had recommended an abortion,
which she refused.117 She stated in an interview that, in a moment of
weakness, she had used “meth only once” while pregnant with her now
deceased child.118 Although the State charged her with murder relating to
drug use, the prosecutor did not charge her with drug possession.119 She
received a minimum sentence of ten years after reaching a plea bargain
with the State.120 As of 2006, sixty women have been prosecuted for drug
dependency under this law.121
Finally, in 2011, the State of Indiana prosecuted Bei Bei Shuai for the
death of her fetus resulting from her attempted suicide.122 Shuai ingested
rat poison, while thirty-three weeks pregnant, after her fiancé had
abandoned her.123 A friend rushed her to the hospital where she was treated
and hospitalized for a month, and the baby was delivered via Caesarean

111. Pilkington, supra note 102. See also NAPW, supra note 73.
112. Pilkington, supra note 102.
113. Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-badmothers.html?
Pagewanted=all&_r=0.
114. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, A Pregnant Woman Is Not a Meth Lab, ACLU BLOG OF
RIGHTS (July 6, 2010, 5:12 pm), http://www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-freedom/pregnantwoman-not-meth-lab.
115. Calhoun, supra note 113.
116. Calhoun, supra note 113.
117. Calhoun, supra note 113.
118. Calhoun, supra note 113.
119. Kolbi-Molinas, supra note 114.
120. Calhoun, supra note 113.
121. Calhoun, supra note 113. See also Debra Cassens Weiss, Drug Abusing Pregnant
Women Under Endangerment Law, Ala. Supreme Court Says, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2013,
6:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/unborn_children_are_protected_by_ che
mical_endangerment_law_alabama_supreme/ (reporting that the Alabama Supreme Court
upheld maternal prosecutions under the chemical endangerment law).
122. Laura Wilkerson, Woman Charged With Murder After Suicide Attempt, OPEN SALON
(Mar. 17, 2011, 7:43 AM), http://open.salon.com/blog/laura_wilkerson/2011/03/17/woman_
charged_with_murder_after_suicide_attempt.
123. Id.
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section.124 However, her baby died a week later.125 The prosecutor’s office
in Indiana charged her under the murder and fetal homicide statutes for
harm caused to the fetus in utero and its subsequent death upon delivery.126
The case of Bei Bei Shuai was one of first impression for the Court of
Appeals of Indiana, given that it had not ruled on whether the State could
lawfully prosecute a mother under the fetal homicide statute.127 The court
relied on Herron v. State where the State had prosecuted a mother for her
cocaine use while pregnant because of the physical effects on the child
after delivery.128 In Herron, the court declined to uphold the prosecution of
the defendant-mother for her cocaine use while pregnant under the
dependency statute because the statute did not recognize unborn children as
a protected class.129 In contrast, the Bei Bei Shuai court determined that the
state legislature had explicitly classified unborn children as “persons” in its
fetal homicide statute.130 Therefore, the court reasoned that the State could
justifiably prosecute on behalf of Bei Bei Shuai’s deceased child under
both the murder and fetal homicide laws.131
As of 2013, Bei Bei Shuai served over a year in prison and she was
released on bond following an appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals.132
Shuai’s case was set for trial in September when the parties reached a plea
agreement on August 2.133 The prosecutor dropped the charges of feticide
and murder, and Shuai pleaded guilty to criminal recklessness and was
sentenced to time served of 178 days.134
2. Unduly Burdensome Post-Viable Fetal Homicide Laws: No Health
or Life Exceptions to Maternal Prosecution
The current fetal homicide laws run contrary to Casey’s guidelines for
maternal health and life exceptions to state regulation of post-viable
pregnancy. Maternal prosecutions are in the sole interest of the fetus and
are not in the best health or life interests of the unborn child and mother.
As a result, the presence of fetal homicide laws “hinder”135 women’s “free

124. Wilkerson, supra note 122.
125. Wilkerson, supra note 122.
126. Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. App. 2012).
127. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 628.
128. Id. (citing Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. App. 2000)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 629.
131. Id. at 628.
132. “I was scared”: Woman Accused of Killing Her Unborn Baby by Drinking Rat
Poison Speaks out Ahead of Murder Trial as Her Lawyer Insists it was Suicide Attempt,
MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 25, 2013, 8:32 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2315028/Bei-Bei-Shuai-Woman-accused-killing-unborn-baby-drinking-rat-poison-speaks
ahead-murder-trial-lawyer-insists-suicide-attempt.html.
133. Bei Bei Shuai Pleads Guilty in Baby’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2013, 7:18
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/bei-bei-shuai-guilty_n_3698383.html.
134. Id.
135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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choice”136 to terminate or continue pregnancies because of the threat of
criminal sanctions.
Prosecuting mothers who suffer stillbirths or miscarriages as a result of
drug dependency or mental health disorders is against public policy. Such
status-based prosecutions trigger mental health distress, which exacerbates
the risk of drug relapse or an underlying mental health condition, and leads
to a likelihood of prosecution.137 Ultimately, the threat of prosecution does
not deter the behavior—it worsens the punishable offense. Moreover, the
subsequent imprisonment will separate the mother from any other existing
children, which injures the psychological bonds within existing family
units.138 If the states desire a decrease in drug dependency and increase in
positive parenting, then the prosecution of at-risk mothers is likely to have
the opposite effect.
In 2010, the National Institute on Healthcare Management published
that ten percent to twenty percent of women suffer maternal depression
during pregnancy or within the first twelve months after delivery.139
Various peer-reviewed studies have confirmed these findings and have
added that maternal anxiety and depression are most common among
pregnant women with histories of mental health disorders.140 Policy
arguments are abound in showing that strengthening the mental health of
at-risk pregnant women, rather than punishing them, will enhance the
potential lives of unborn children, while respecting women’s personhood.
At post-viability, the fetal homicide laws make pregnant women a
“special class of persons”141 whose pregnancy status permits overreaching
state scrutiny. For example, in Mississippi, possession of cocaine, or any
derivative thereof, yields a prison sentence from a year142 up to a maximum
of thirty years,143 dependent on the weight of the substance in possession.
However, as the prosecution of Rennie Gibbs144 demonstrates, a pregnant
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
137. Lynn M. Paltrow, Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women, REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM PROJECT (April 1992), http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles /19
92stat.htm.
138. Id.
139. Identifying and Treating Maternal Depression: Strategies & Considerations for
Health Plans, NAT’L INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION,
http://nihcm.org/pdf/FINAL_MaternalDepression6-7.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
140. Pregnancy and Mental Health, STANFORD SCHOOL OF MEDICINE: CENTER FOR
NEUROSCIENCE & WOMEN’S HEALTH, http://womensneuroscience.stanford.edu/wellness_
clinic/Pregnancy.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2013); Psychiatric Disorders During Pregnancy,
MASS. GENERAL HOSPITAL: MGH CENTER FOR WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH, http://www. wo
mensmentalhealth.org/specialty-clinics/psychiatric-disorders-during-pregnancy/ (last visited
Sept. 2, 2013).
141. National Advocates for Pregnant Women in the New York Times Magazine, THE
OVERBROOK FOUNDATION (May 4, 2012), http://www.overbrook.org/2012/05/04/nationaladvocates-for-pregnant-women-in-the-new-york-times-magazine/.
142. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(A) (2006) (less than one tenth of a gram).
143. Id. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(E) (thirty grams).
144. Pilkington, supra note 102.
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woman in Mississippi can face life imprisonment when her crack cocaine
possession causes the death of her fetus.
Finally, states could eventually restrict pregnant women’s “drink[ing,
obesity,] or fail[ure] to follow doctors’ orders.”145 Therefore, pregnant
women could potentially suffer deprivation of legal activities because
legislatures assert an interest to protect fetal life. Notably, state
governments have been silent on whether women should abstain from
prescription medication, rigorous sports, and daily activities in the interest
of the fetus.146 However, many activities, such as exercise or prescription
medicine, are in the best health interest of the mother, though states may
prohibit the behaviors to save the life of the fetus. If the states proscribe all
maternal acts to protect fetal life, then states will violate Casey’s maternal
life and health exceptions and will sacrifice women’s personhood rights at
the expense of their fetuses. Eventually, women may choose to abstain
from motherhood to evade criminal sanctions, particularly women with
addictions and mental health disorders.147 Essentially, these overbroad fetal
homicide laws enable state legislatures to prevent the destruction of life by
any means necessary at the expense of women’s reproductive agency.

III. REDEFINING FETAL PERSONHOOD LAWS: BALANCING
FETAL AND WOMEN’S INTERESTS
If fetal pain and homicide laws continue in this manner, then the laws
will continue to diminish women’s privacy rights merely because women
choose to become pregnant or terminate pregnancies. Therefore, if state
legislatures determine to maintain fetal personhood measures, then they
should amend them in order to respect women’s legal rights afforded under
the Constitution.
First, states should not regulate the pre-viable stages of pregnancy, as
reaffirmed in Casey. However, states may pass fetal protection measures in
the post-viable stages and strictly construe them, so long as there are
maternal health and life limitations to the fetal “personhood.” As the fetal
personhood laws stand currently, personhood seems resoundingly absolute
as soon as the fetus is viable, and therefore, the mother’s privacy protection
ceases to exist. If states amend their current fetal personhood legislation to
honor the post-viable health and life limitations reaffirmed in Casey, then
the laws should pass constitutional muster.

145. Elliott, supra note 7.
146. Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Feminist Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women’s Rights During Pregnancy, 26
LAW & INEQ. 171, 176 (2008).
147. ACLU Asks Alabama Court to Protect the Rights of Pregnant Women, ACLU (July
16, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/aclu-asks-alabama-court-protect-right
s-pregnant-women; NAPW, supra note 73.
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Second, the states should limit the breadth of regulations during the
post-viable stages of pregnancy in considering the life, physical and mental
health interests of the mother, as well, as relevant interests of the fetus. In
doing so, the narrowing of fetal “personhood” and subsequent maternal
prosecutions will result. As a recommendation, state governments should
enact preventive measures. States should fund local mental health
programs and improve drug rehabilitation facilities.148 In doing so, state
governments will foster the mother’s health interest, and in turn, the health
of any future unborn children.
Finally, states should cease imprisoning pregnant women for chemical
endangerment of unborn children,149 unless the courts determine that the
women are dangerous to the community under the respective states’
sentencing guidelines for relevant reasons. As for women with existing
children, states should refrain from separating mothers from their existing
children as a mode of punishment for substance abuse during pregnancy.150
Rather, separation should only occur if the pregnant mother is judicially
determined as an unfit parent for her existing children.

CONCLUSION
Although states have an important interest in ensuring the health of
their unborn citizens, the states also have a duty to respect the pre-existing
rights of their born citizens. Laws to protect fetal and maternal life can
coexist. Given that women have the right to terminate pregnancies prior to
viability, narrowly tailoring existing legislation to refrain from the
abridgement of reproductive privacy affords pregnant women their right to
personhood. Moreover, states must reexamine their current health policies
as a means to protect fetal life in the post-viable stages of pregnancy, rather
than enacting laws that eliminate women’s right to her personhood.

148. NAPW, supra note 73.
149. Debra Cassens Weiss, Drug Abusing Pregnant Women Under Endangerment Law,
Ala. Supreme Court Says, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2013, 6:30 am), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/unborn_children_are_protected_by_chemical_endangerment_
law_alabama_supreme_/.
150. Adam Nossiter, In Alabama, A Crackdown on Pregnant Drug Users, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/us/15mothers.html?_r=0.

